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Anger, Gender, Race, and the
Limits of Free Speech Protection
Andy Carr

Abstract
Individuals’ mental states are relevant to many processes in America’s
legal system, from finding parties had consciousness of guilt to determining
damages for tort victims’ pain and suffering. Under the First Amendment,
emotions are taken into consideration for assessing the boundaries of free
speech rights. Among the essential emotions affecting analyses of free
speech rights—and limitations—is anger. This essay examines how First
Amendment jurisprudence grapples with anger in two free speech contexts:
the “fighting words” doctrine under Chaplinsky and the “incitement”
doctrine under Brandenburg. The analysis finds a baseline definition of
anger that is subtly, yet importantly, gendered and racialized. For the
“dormant” Chaplinsky doctrine, troubling questions of systematic bias may
be limited; however, anger’s conceptualization produces more-serious
concerns under Brandenburg. It concludes with recommendations for
constitutional law scholars and practitioners working to vindicate broader
First Amendment protections irrespective of gender, race, and other
individual positionalities.

I. INTRODUCTION
Like other areas of American law and jurisprudence, free speech rights
under the First Amendment use emotions as essential indicia in analyses of
claims, including those concerning individual rights. Anger is understood
to affect individuals in a particularly powerful way. Typically, American
constitutional law understands it as a combination of instinctual and
cognitive-rationalist sensations at the individual level, reflecting
perspectives from Roman Stoic Seneca to the modern works of Martha
Nussbaum. In this generalized view, people may experience anger when
engaged in speaking or listening—and often will experience it in the
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contentious debates of modern society—but can manage to curb most
impulses to lash out (i.e., violently), at least most of the time.
Yet, First Amendment jurisprudence permits some exceptions to the
broad sweep of free speech rights at least in part with anger in mind. Two
of these doctrines hold that certain speech does not receive protection under
the First Amendment: situations where the speech is so patently offensive
as to constitute “fighting words,” i.e., statements likely to induce a listener
to move to censure the speaker; and situations where the speech is meant
to and likely will incite listeners to heed a call to join the speaker, i.e.,
statements intended to command others to engage in “imminent lawless
action.” These scenarios correspond to doctrines established in the
landmark cases of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire and Brandenburg v. Ohio,
respectively. Both doctrines recognize the potential for anger to override
rationality and restraint, carving out room for the state to prevent or
terminate unprotected speech perceived as especially likely to produce
those results.
Per those examples, First Amendment jurisprudence echoes well
Nussbaum and others’ work on emotions, and especially their framing of
anger, in direct, face-to-face speech contexts. This essay challenges those
streams of work, drawing heavily from critical legal studies (CLS),
including feminist and critical race theorists work in U.S. constitutional
law, to highlight the ways in which these understandings of anger are
limited. Ultimately, these doctrines give only a partial view of anger – and
the ways in which anger is understood and permitted to be expressed
produce concrete inequalities. These doctrines also conflate distinct forms
of ressentiment and resentment with anger, and free speech jurisprudence
as a whole takes for granted an overly narrow, context-less view of
“objective” anger. The way anger is understood, and can be expressed
given prevailing social norms and legal tests, essentially erases individuals
and groups (e.g., women, nonwhite and queer/LGBTQ+ people, and others)
who face unequally distributed constraints on expressing certain emotions,
or how they are permitted to express them, in public settings. Finally, this
essay juxtaposes Chaplinsky’s “fighting words” doctrine with “incitement”
under Brandenburg, which share a common conceptual framework for
understanding anger as a politically volatile emotion, yet present distinct
normative and strategic concerns from a CLS perspective. This essay
concludes with a summary and discussion of these phenomena as they
concern First Amendment scholarship and jurisprudence, providing some
suggestions for subsequent research pushing toward achieving moreflexible, truly expansive free speech protections.
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II. EMOTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL AND LEGAL LIFE
A. Martha Nussbaum’s Cognitivist Framework for Understanding
Emotions in Political and Legal Contexts
Emotions can be defined on various grounds: their psychological or
environmental origins, their effects on the individual experiencing them,
their rationality (or irrationality), and so on.1 In American legal and political
contexts, however, Martha Nussbaum’s reconceptualization of the Stoics
most clearly captures the idea of emotions as “forms of evaluative judgment
that ascribe great importance to things and persons outside one’s control.”2
In this “cognitivist” understanding, emotions are not “thoughtless natural
energies,” but rather are tied to an object—for instance, to another person
or to a thing, even a situation—and are felt about that object, with intention,
i.e., because of one’s individual, subjective relationship to the referent
object.3 At the same time, Nussbaum’s cognitivist view raises the question
of exceptions. Reflecting on her own experience with intense grief after the
sudden passing of her mother, for instance, Nussbaum described a
seemingly “kinetic and affective aspect to emotion that does not look like
a judgment or any part of it.”4 This, too, is folded into the reasoning
capacity of the individual in question, and Nussbaum clarifies the
simultaneity of these processes—an individual experiencing an intense
emotional state is not “coolly” contemplating how to respond to an
emotion-producing object-stimulus, but rather experiences the recognition
and the internal “upheaval” altogether in one complex response.5 The
“kinetic” and the rational judgment are linked, not competing, facets of a
unified experience.
Altogether, this rational-cognitivist model explains emotions as
originating from a cogent, systematic response to some outside stimulus.
Thus, human emotions—glee, fear, grief, rage—all flow from this general
internal framework, irrespective of the specific situations or stimuli giving
rise to them. For present purposes, the emotions undergirding individual
expression, encompassed in concepts relating to free speech in U.S.
constitutional law, often are understood in similar terms. From denouncing
politicians and parties or mourning an electoral defeat to the passions
1.
2.

See Part II(B), infra, for an overview of the limited, legal scope considered herein.
Martha Nussbaum, Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance 185 (2004),
in ROBERT C. SOLOMON (ed.), THINKING ABOUT FEELING: CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS ON
EMOTIONS (hereinafter “THINKING ABOUT FEELING”) (emphasis added).
3. Id. at 188. Nussbaum elaborates further, discussing the complexity of emotions and
their relation to one’s valuation of an object. Id. at 276. In her chapter, Nussbaum powerfully
begins by exploring her emotions as she raced toward her ailing mother’s bedside, only to
arrive too late; her mother had passed briefly before Nussbaum made it. The object (her
mother) for the author’s emotions brings her conceptualization vividly to life. Id. at 189.
4. Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 281.
5. Id. at 281–82.
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underlying protest marchers’ shouted slogans and homemade signs,
external actors and events may be seen as responses which combine the
kinetic and the rational.
B. Emotions in the Legal System: Embracing the Cognitivist View
As Nussbaum observes, the American legal system generally embraces
the cognitivist view sketched above.6 But law’s understanding of emotion
adds a normative overlay, a complex of presumptions constraining judges
and juries’ evaluations, in which, Nussbaum summarizes, “the prevailing
attitude to emotions in general in the Anglo-American legal tradition … as
we shall see, connects emotions closely with thought about important
benefits and harms, and thus, as well, with prevailing social norms
concerning what benefits and harms are rightly thought important.”7
Hence, while one can distinguish emotions from “bodily appetites such
as hunger and thirst,” as well as “from objectless moods, such as irritation
and certain types of depression,”8 emotions are evaluated legally within
social norm-based bounds: judges and juries, like all people, may consider
another person to be “overreacting” to something, i.e., they evaluate the
reasonableness of others’ emotional responses.9 In law, this serves a
functional need since, absent this allowance for assessing the quality of
individual emotional states, entire swaths of legal doctrine—like a
defendant’s mens rea (“state of mind”) or a plaintiff’s claims for damages
predicated on “pain and suffering”—would fall away. In fact, it would be
difficult to imagine many modern legal doctrines without a framework for
“appraisals of evaluative beliefs.”10 The question, however, turns to the
appropriateness and usefulness of the present model for doing so.
C. Seneca to SCOTUS: On Anger and Ressentiment in Life and Law
Like other human emotions, anger has a cognitive logic and a socially
defined set of norms surrounding it, no less in formal jurisprudence than in
society at large.11 This modern framework has deep roots. Two millennia
ago, Seneca described anger as “the most hideous and frenzied of all the
emotions,” a feeling “all excitement and impulse” and “greedy for
vengeance,” as a “brief insanity.”12 Seneca noted its ubiquity in the charges
6. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 21–2 (2004).
7. Id. at 22.
8. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 23 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 31.
10. Id. at 34.
11. Id. at 32–33.
12. SENECA, ON ANGER 17 [Book I], in SENECA: MORAL AND POLITICAL ESSAYS (John
M. Cooper & J.F. Procopé, eds. 1995) (hereinafter “ANGER”); see also FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 21–22, 40, 48–50 (Keith Ansell-Pearson ed.
2007) (discussing anger, similarly, as an impulsive reaction, but noting that law developed
on a presumption that “the criminal deserves to be punished because he could have acted
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brought before the “law-courts” of his contemporary Rome, as well as in
the warfare throughout his known world.13 He also, like Greeks before him,
articulated its cause as a desire for retribution, “damaging” a person who
has wronged the angered individual.14
In the intervening millennia since Seneca—and, notably, in the postSeptember 11, 2001, American milieu, or in the aftermath of the 2008 and
2016 elections of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump—anger as
an emotion with a critical political valence has come back into sharpened
focus in humanities and social science research.15 Some, like John
Ehrenreich in his recent book, Third Wave Capitalism, link anger (with
anxiety and rage) to overarching structural problems in government and the
economy in capitalist, industrialized societies like the U.S., opening the
door to systemic and structural discussions of great value here.16
Researchers in philosophy, politics, and psychology have not reached a
consensus on which emotions could underlie political systems’ outcomes,
whether in the case of individual election results or in terms of the
theorized, oft-studied polarization of American elites and voters.17 All the
while, anger has been a recurrent subject of focus for intuitive reasons – as
a powerful emotion intertwined with individual, group, and systemic

otherwise,” which Nietzsche laconically calls “a piece of [moral] perfection … difficult to
believe”) (emphases in original) (hereinafter “GENEALOGY”).
13. Id. at 18–19.
14. Seneca, supra note 12, at 20.
15. See generally Antoine J. Banks, The Public’s Anger: White Racial Attitudes and
Opinions Toward Health Care Reform, 36 POL. BEHAVIOR 493 (2014) (on the intersections
of race and emotions/affect amid health care reform debates of President Obama’s first
term); Sue Campbell, Being Dismissed: The Politics of Emotional Expression, 9 HYPATIA
46 (1994) (discussing, inter alia, how emotion terms characterize and dismiss women in
political and public forums); Todd H. Hall & Andrew A.G. Ross, Affective Politics after
9/11, 69 INT’L ORG. 847 (2015) (extending emotional/affective politics research analyses to
significant individual actors in post-9/11 international relations contexts); Lilliana Mason,
“I Disrespectfully Agree”: The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue
Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 128 (2015) (relating research on emotions and emotional
intensity to separate dimensions of political polarization in contemporary America); Patrick
R. Miller, The Emotional Citizen: Emotion as a Function of Political Sophistication, 32 POL.
PSY. 575, 579–81 (2011) (finding, inter alia, a link between emotional intensity and political
sophistication, and hence advancing Nussbaum’s view of emotion—including anger—as a
cognitive process, while noting sophisticated political observers tend to better link their
anger to relevant policies addressing their concerns); accord Shana Kushner Gadarian &
Bethany Albertson, Anxiety, Immigration, and the Search for Information, 35 POL. PSY. 133
(2014) (finding anxiety is linked to paying closer attention to news information, echoing
Miller’s emotionality-sophistication findings).
16. JOHN EHRENREICH, THIRD WAVE CAPITALISM: HOW MONEY, POWER, AND THE
PURSUIT OF SELF-INTEREST HAVE IMPERILED THE AMERICAN DREAM 154–72 (2016).
17. See, e.g., Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary
American Politics, 46 POLITY 411 (2014) (finding, inter alia, the U.S. electorate of the early
2010s had become more sharply polarized than at any time since the Civil War).
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political action and reaction, and thus of great importance to the legal
institutions which adjudicate many of society’s conflicts.
At least in Nussbaum’s view, anger (like grief) has complex overlaps
with adjacent feelings and the broader affect of a given individual.18 One
key emotion often linked to anger is ressentiment. The term owes its
popularization in significant part to the thought experiment in Friedrich
Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, where those who suffer
indignities without any “proper response of action” (on account of their
lower “moral” status) eventually will reach a kind of steady state of
enduring, repressed disturbance.19 A generation later, Max Scheler
described ressentiment somewhat more broadly as a “self-poisoning of the
mind…a lasting mental attitude, caused by the systematic repression of
certain emotions and affects,” e.g., “revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the
impulse to detract, and spite.”20 Scheler’s development of ressentiment
recast it as a progressive mental state: it starts with repressed desires for
retribution among “those who are ‘weak’ in some respect” (e.g., in social
standing); over time, however, it becomes more than a mere emotion,
eventually detaching from “definite objects” (like specific persons) and
becoming directed more toward “the sting of authority” itself.21
Ressentiment, while related, is not coterminous with resentment, and
should be understood as a dynamic emotional state with long time horizons,
including both sustained periods and discrete flashes of anger as
possibilities. These three mental states—anger, resentment, ressentiment—
are linked, often working in tandem, but should be viewed as conceptually
distinct.
Despite the concerns of Seneca and his fellow Stoics about its potential
for evil, anger in many legal contexts falls narrowly within Nussbaum’s
cognitivist framing.22 One area where anger plays a substantial role but has
been poorly conceptualized is in speech-related claims. Adapting Seneca’s
understanding of anger as a retribution-seeking emotion flowing from
another’s provocation to “retaliation,” the First Amendment’s “fighting
words” doctrine set forth in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire has persisted for
over 70 years.23 Part III, below, elaborates on the logic of Chaplinsky and
18.
19.
20.

See generally THINKING ABOUT FEELING, supra note 2 at 271–74.
GENEALOGY, supra note 12 at 20 (describing the “slave revolt”).
MAX SCHELER, RESSENTIMENT 4 (1915) (Louis A. Coser trans. 2015) (hereinafter
“RESSENTIMENT”).
21. Id. at 5–6.
22. For a discussion of voluntary manslaughter charges—in which a defendant’s
murder charge may be reduced if the act of killing is proven to be “in response to [an
‘adequate,’ ‘reasonable’] provocation” and “without sufficient cooling time,” among other
requirements—see MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND
THE LAW 37–8 (2004).
23. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942); see also Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L.
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provides an overview of developments in free speech jurisprudence since it
was decided, taking up the question of whether and, if so, to what extent—
American law properly captures the dynamics of anger and related
emotions. Part III then turns to Brandenburg v. Ohio and the “incitement”
doctrine articulated thereunder,24 explaining how the same foundational,
cognitivist understanding of anger underlying both decisions elides anger’s
many individual and contextual variations, despite different implications
across the two doctrines.

III. FREE SPEECH AND FURY: THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
INSULT, AND ANGER
A. Generalized, Stepwise Approaches to First Amendment Free
Speech Analysis
Expansive free speech protections emerged relatively recently, coming
through a series of First Amendment cases between 1919 and the early
1940s.25 Initially, “social and religious activists” comprised some of the
most famous litigants, among them “abolitionists, the anarchists, the
Industrial Workers of the World, the Socialist party, and the early labor and
women’s movements,” all of whom increasingly pressured state and federal
courts to recognize their repression as inimical to democratic values.26
Contemporary understandings of free speech doctrine first appeared only
in various dissents from this era; in 1939’s Hague v. CIO, the Supreme
Court finally articulated the classic view of public spaces like sidewalks
and public parks as places “immemorially … held in trust for the use of the
public,” including free speech, assembly, and other core First Amendment
Rights.27
This transformation was neither total nor inexorable through the 1950s
and 1960s. The U.S. Supreme Court maintained a variety of restrictive
doctrinal tests, like the “clear and present danger” test (where speech could
be proscribed if it presented a “clear and present danger” of inciting

REV. 799, 815 (2010) (discussing how various “First Amendment doctrines rely on a model
of the audience as rational, skeptical, and capable of sorting through masses of information
to find truth,” but that exceptions, like Chaplinsky or the “incitement” of audiences under
Brandenburg v. Ohio, remain relatively “rare” outliers); accord Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
24. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). Brandenburg’s established and extant doctrine
is known by several terms, including (as here) reference to “incitement” or to its “imminent
lawless action” (or “imminence”) test. These phrases are used interchangeably throughout
this essay.
25. See generally David Kairys, Freedom of Speech 190, 191, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:
A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys, 3d ed. 1998).
26. Kairys, supra note 25, at 193.
27. Id. (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 515 (1939)); accord Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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unlawful conduct), established in the 1919 case Schenck v. United States.28
Although Schenck ostensibly overruled the earlier “bad tendency” test
under Patterson v. Colorado, from a decade earlier, the same “bad
tendency” test was used during the term immediately following Schenck,
leaving a consistent understanding of free speech and its limits in flux.29
But by the 1960s and 1970s, the “liberal paradigm” of modern First
Amendment jurisprudence had largely established its continuing, canonical
two-step analytical framework for free speech challenges.30 Under the
liberal paradigm, speech first is “categorized as either protected or
unprotected based on its subject matter,” with content-based (or viewpointbased) regulations of speech assessed as presumptively unconstitutional.31
If the regulated speech in question is found to be protected, such speech
generally cannot be curtailed unless the state can prove that their action
restricting it “is furthering a compelling interest than cannot be furthered”
by less-restrictive means.32 Unprotected speech, meanwhile, can include
forms of speech relevant for present purposes, including “incitement to
imminent lawless action” and “fighting words.”33 Other doctrines address
idiosyncrasies across a range of speech contexts from commercial speech
to prior restraints on press publications,34 or permit reasonable “time, place,
manner” (“TPM”) restrictions on the manner in which speech can occur in
public venues,35 but the same basic framework governs all free speech
claims of present concern.
B. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, Its Progeny, and Free Speech
Jurisprudence of Anger
In Chaplinsky, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses appealed his
conviction under New Hampshire’s Public Laws, which forbade
individuals from, inter alia, addressing “any offensive, derisive or
annoying word to any other person” in public spaces.36 Chaplinsky
admitted to “distributing the literature of his sect,” which triggered public

28. Kairys, supra note 25 at 196; accord Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
29. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919) (applying the “bad tendency” test in upholding the conviction of a leaflet
distributor).
30. Kairys, supra note 25, at 197.
31. Kairys, supra note 25, at 197.
32. This, in other words, is the quintessential “strict scrutiny” standard. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 197–99.
35. Id. at 197; for an illustration of overlaps between TPM and implicitly contentspecific speech restrictions, see McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 493 (2014) (unanimously
holding a Massachusetts “buffer zone” law prohibiting protest of abortion clinics
unconstitutional on grounds that it was insufficiently narrowly tailored and thus infringed
free speech).
36. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
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complaints and eventual intervention by the City Marshal.37 The Marshal
“warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless,” but, after
persisting, a traffic officer apprehended Chaplinsky later the same day.38
When the Marshal encountered Chaplinsky and the traffic officer en route
to the station, Chaplinsky allegedly uttered the words which made the case
famous, calling the Marshal a “damned fascist.”39
Proceeding to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, and eventually
appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court, Chaplinsky lost his case every step
of the way.40 In upholding Chaplinsky’s conviction, the U.S. Supreme
Court put forth its canonical articulation for permitting state actors to
restrain “fighting words,” which merits quotation in full:
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech
is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and
the insulting or “fighting” words—those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.41
The U.S. Supreme Court insisted later in the opinion it was bound to
defer to New Hampshire interpretations of state law,42 but the “fighting
words” doctrine it propounded as a matter of constitutional law was its own
creation. The attendant Chaplinsky test, like other legal tests referenced
above,43 applies a reasonableness standard, i.e., what “would be … likely
to cause an average addressee to fight,” in establishing whether a
censorious state action is constitutional.44
Chaplinsky quickly proved controversial, producing as it did a
seemingly nebulous principle in free speech jurisprudence. By the early
1950s, subsequent free speech cases began to curtail Chaplinsky’s reach,45
37. Id. at 569–70.
38. Id. at 570.
39. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. The exact phrasing has been given as a “damned
fascist” or alternately a “goddamned fascist” in various apocrypha to the case.
40. Id. at 568–69.
41. Id. at 571–72 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 572.
43. See notes 6–7, supra, and accompanying discussion.
44. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
45. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (restricting Chaplinsky,
holding that words constituting “part of arguments on questions of wide public interest and
freedom” cannot be “fighting words” within Chaplinsky’s meaning).
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even as the scope of free speech rights overall remained less capacious than
they are today. Still, the Supreme Court’s midcentury cases established
broad outlines for constitutional regulations of speech that remain, as in
cases of “fighting words” described above. Altogether, from Chaplinsky
through signal cases in the late 1960s, the range of speech the government
may proscribe ex ante (through prior restraints) or may halt while underway
grew modestly to include speech that is likely to incite violence; lies; the
lewd and profane; and speech which falls into other categories of marginal
speech46 with low or entirely lacking “value” to merit state protection.47
In the last seven decades, all these varieties of less-protected or wholly
unprotected speech—and the Chaplinsky rule on “fighting words”
notably—have been repeatedly challenged. Chaplinsky’s original rule,
unlike many others, has been narrowed with great regularity; after R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, the “fighting words” doctrine’s status has been described
variously as “confusion”48 or as being “quarantined,”49 if still short of
functionally dead. In R.A.V., the Court unanimously declared a St. Paul,
Minnesota ordinance unconstitutional on grounds that it was an
impermissible content-based regulation of speech and reversed the
attendant conviction of a teenager for burning a cross on the property of a
Black family in the city.50 The ordinance at issue in R.A.V. expressly was
written with the “fighting words” doctrine in mind, but as the Supreme
Court’s majority declared the law unconstitutional on its face, the Court
thus failed to reach the question of permissible post-Chaplinsky grounds
for proscribing incendiary individual speech.51 In short, the content
specificity of the St. Paul law, constituting a content-based regulation,
obviated any need for analyzing questions about the earlier precedent.52
Adding further confusion, a decade after R.A.V., the Supreme Court
46. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1 (1984).
47. Among the “values” of free speech guarded by the First Amendment are those of
democratic deliberation; the search for and elevation of truth; and ensuring maximal liberty
vis-à-vis pluralistic society. See David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From HandHolding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 326 (1994); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public
Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990) (on democratic deliberation and the search for truth
functions). For a broad overview of limited situations in which content-based regulation of
speech is permissible and the underlying logic, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation
and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
48. Melody C. Hurdle, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: The Continuing Confusion of the
Fighting Words Doctrine, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1143 (1994) 1148.
49. Burton Caine, The Trouble with Fighting Words: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is
a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 547
(2004).
50. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
51. Id. at 381.
52. Id. at 382–83.
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distinguished protected expressive conduct from unprotected targeted
intimidation in Virginia v. Black.53 In Black, the Court struck down in part
a Virginia statute that defined cross-burning as prima facie evidence of an
intent to discriminate, but upheld the conviction of a Virginia Beach man
for his specific act of burning a cross on a family’s lawn as an instance of
targeted intimidation, i.e., an unprotected “true threat.”54 As will be
examined in greater detail below,55 the very boundaries between these
categories of speech are not entirely clear; reading R.A.V. and Virginia v.
Black in tandem highlights some of the difficulty in distinguishing among
fully protected political expressions (including baldly racist viewpoints)
and specifically targeted “true threats.”
C. Beyond Individual Engagement: Brandenburg, “Incitement” and
“Imminent Lawless Action,” and First Amendment Doctrines for
Group-Related Speech
In some of the signal cases surveyed above, the cognitivist view of
emotional processes and of anger are apparent: “fighting words” are a rare,
and generally sidelined, exception to free speech protections in part because
they are expected to be so provocative to the listener in a flash of anger. In
those contexts, “fighting words” are valueless speech under the First
Amendment because reasonable listeners, angered by the insulting
utterance, should be expected to react. Otherwise, free speech
jurisprudence expects some greater measure of restraint. Yet a core
problem with this framework is how narrowly irrepressible anger was
construed, as well as the absence of any consideration of how individual
positionalities, of speakers or listeners, may affect real-world interactions.
Leading American jurists’ understanding of anger, like Nussbaum’s, also
remains limited by the contexts in which they work best: one-on-one
interactions between speakers (or a speaker and a listener) engaging in realtime where an egregious insult is lobbed from one to the other.
Anger’s complexities demand deeper interrogation. After all, one-toone, real-time interactions are not always the basis for violent or otherwise
unlawful conduct in response to contentious speech. Across the various
scenarios of in-person listeners’ reactions (e.g., including Chaplinsky), free
speech jurisprudence separates spoken expressions from “actions” as
distinct concepts. A person’s actions are fair game for regulation and
restriction under the constitution, but their expressions—and especially the
specific content or viewpoint they express56 – typically are not.

53. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
54. Id.; accord Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (first articulating the “true
threats” doctrine).
55. See infra, Part IV.
56. See notes 26–35, 51–54, supra and accompanying discussion.

222

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31:2

Yet, in the concept of “incitement” under Brandenburg v. Ohio,57
similar reasoning processes yielded even graver contradictions. While
demonstrating a somewhat more-sophisticated understanding of duration
and timing issues relating to anger after the earlier “fighting words” cases,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg ruled that Ohio’s criminal
syndicalism law prohibiting certain speech which called for illegal action
violated free speech rights, establishing an “imminence” requirement for
halting or barring a speaker based on the content of their speech.58 More
formally, the Court articulated a two-pronged test for lawfully prohibiting
“inciting” speech: the speaker’s words must (1) be “directed at inciting or
producing imminent lawless action” and (2) be “likely to incite or produce
such action.”59 “Mere advocacy” or “teaching” of illegality, in other words,
cannot be prohibited by the state; a speaker must actually seek and be likely
to achieve whatever unlawful conduct.
In the five decades since Brandenburg was decided, the foregoing test
has remained intact and virtually unchanged.60 More recently, Brandenburg
became a subject of academic interest in the wake of the September 11,
2001, terror attacks61 and—of even greater interest here—became a
recurring focus amid today’s prevalent, online-based forms of speech.62
Regarding the former, Brandenburg has been at the periphery of various
cases concerning free speech and other civil liberties in the “post-9/11
world,” including those “upholding measures taken in connection with
airport security, subway searches, restrictions on political speech at
political conventions, and immigration decisions.”63 Most prominently,
whereas Brandenburg imposes imminence and likelihood requirements in
restricting speakers who may incite others, Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project upheld the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”), effectively ruling that nonprofit organizations could be barred
from instructing foreign terrorist groups about international humanitarian

57. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
58. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444.
59. Id. at 447. This test became known as the “imminence” test or the “clear and present
danger” test; again the terms are used interchangeably throughout this essay, though the
latter is more commonly used in the literature; accord David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes,
Rethinking the Clear and Present Danger Test, 73 IND. L.J. 1217, 1233 (1998).
60. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam) (affirming Brandenburg and
clarifying the imminence requirement necessarily excludes censuring future lawless action);
see also Part IV, infra for discussion.
61. See, e.g., Avidan Y. Cover, Presumed Innocence: Judicial Risk Assessment in the
Post-9/11 World, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415 (2014).
62. See Daniel T. Kobil, Advocacy on Line: Brandenburg v. Ohio and Speech in the
Internet Era, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 227 (2000).
63. Cover, supra note 61, at 1430–31.
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law encompassed within AEDPA’s meaning of providing “material
support” for terrorists.64
Another modern phenomenon, one which complicates the decades-old
Brandenburg standard and the disjointed Chaplinsky framework, has been
under-theorized despite its growing prominence: stochastic violence.
Stochastic violence itself generalizes the earlier phrase “stochastic
terrorism,” most-frequently used in journalistic contexts, which denotes a
speaker’s “use of mass communications,” e.g., online outlets and social
networks, to inspire others to perpetrate violence.65 Neither the
Brandenburg test nor its derivative elaborations in Hess v. Indiana had
contemplated this distinct speech-violence dynamic, notwithstanding
stochastic violence conceptually underlying judicial analyses in several
high-profile cases.66
Brandenburg and the “incitement” doctrine it formalized rest on an
understanding of anger that is facially consistent with Chaplinksy—i.e.,
anger as a sudden, sharp emotion that stultifies, if not overrides, reason. But
where these cases diverge appears telling. In Chaplinsky, the sharp anger
of listeners in response to what was deemed a galling insult led the Court

64. Id. at 1431–35; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). See also
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214, § 303.)
65. See, e.g., G2geek, Stochastic Terrorism: Triggering the Shooters, DAILY KOS (Jan.
10, 2011), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2011/1/10/934890/- [ https://perma.cc/6ERKQQ8V].
66. See, e.g., Andy Campbell, 2 Proud Boys Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison over Gang
Assault in New York, HUFFPOST (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/proudboys-sentenced-new-york_n_5daf2841e4b0f34e3a7d652c [https://perma.cc/6XPP-ZV7Z]
(discussing the cases of two far-right Proud Boys gang members—Maxwell Hare and John
Kinsman—were sentenced to four years in prison each, along with “another five years of
supervised release”; during their sentencing, the Manhattan judge, Mark Dwyer, connected
them to Proud Boys leader Gavin McInnes, a co-founder of VICE Media and virulent racist
“who has repeatedly tried to distance himself” from the organization). See also Sarah
Mervosh, F.B.I. Arrests U.S. Soldier Who Discussed Bomb Plot, Authorities Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/us/us-army-soldier-arrestedJarrett-William-Smith.html [https://perma.cc/3NTZ-R9KW] (reporting on the arrest of
active-duty soldier Jarrett William Smith, suspected of plotting to bomb “a major news
network” and threatening then-Democratic Primary candidate Beto O’Rourke’s
assassination); Suspected Neo-Nazi Charged with Gun Crime, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov.
14, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndtx/pr/suspected-neo-nazi-charged-gun-crime
[https://perma.cc/X3BY-QU5A] (disclosing and discussing the arrest of Aiden BruceUmbaugh, who ‘was charged with [unlawful] possession of a firearm” after being “arrested
in Post, Texas, dressed in tactical gear and in possession of multiple assault rifles” and “at
least 1,500 rounds of ammunition”); Jason Wilson, Far Right Network Orchestrated
Synagogue Attacks, FBI Says, GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2019), https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2019/nov/16/far-right-network-orchestrated-synagogue-attacks-fbi-says [https:/
/perma.cc/M7WC-EAMQ] (reporting how Richard Tobin, of Nazi group The Base, directed
and coordinated multiple acts of vandalism against synagogues in the Midwest, including
defacing buildings “with fascist and [anti-Semitic] propaganda”).
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to categorize the speaker’s utterances as valueless and unprotected; in
Brandenburg, a case whose plaintiff was a rallying member of the Ku Klux
Klan, listeners’ outraged responses dropped from the analysis altogether,
since Brandenburg himself was speaking only of his ideology, not
imminent intent to act. Granted, the Ohio criminal syndicalism law was
fatally flawed inasmuch as it was “overly broad” anyway, encompassing
far more than the Klan in its overreach.67 Nonetheless, the Brandenburg
framework subtly removed emotional (i.e., intensely angry) reactions to a
specific form of speech (i.e., racist speech) from inclusion among those
instances where the cognitivist model contemplates impulsive reactivity.
Regardless of the Court’s intent, no discernible principle for this
classification decision is apparent.
These cases significantly diverge in two further senses. First,
Chaplinsky is not a particularly robust precedent in the present century; it
has been described in recent years as a “quarantined”68 doctrine, its crucial
“injury” prong “deemed no longer operative,”69 and some of its (few) morerecent favorable citations in federal court opinions have been doctrinally
muddled at best.70 The same cannot be said for Brandenburg, which
remains actively litigated and an active force in First Amendment
scholarship. Second, Brandenburg’s extant doctrine governing
“incitement” adds some valuable nuance to the idea of anger under the First
Amendment—it still presumes anger can override reason, but it
acknowledges that direct insults are not the only way for speakers to trigger
anger, and thus action, among listeners. Instead, Brandenburg
contemplates agreeing listeners acting on the speaker’s words encouraging
the former to engage in “imminent lawless action.” Although this nuance
is a welcome corrective to Chaplinsky’s oversimplified framework,
Brandenburg poses other challenges for contemporary CLS theorists and
practitioners, several of which merit detailed discussion.

67. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (articulating a “line between ideas
and overt acts” as demarcating what is and is not subject to permissible government
regulation).
68. Caine, supra note 49 (concluding, inter alia, that it would be a mistake “to conclude
that there is no danger to freedom of speech on the theory that Chaplinsky has been
quarantined and the fighting words doctrine rendered lame” because “the virus remains
viable”).
69. Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1533,
1548 (2017).
70. JoAnne Sweeny, Incitement in the Era of Trump and Charlottesville, 47 CAP. U. L.
REV. 585, 620 (2019) (citing United States v. White, 698 F.3d 1005, 1016 (7th Cir. 2012),
which used the Chaplinsky framework to decide a “purely verbal criminal solicitation
case”).
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IV. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS:
THE GENDERED AND RACIALIZED NARROWNESS OF
ANGER UNDER THE LAW
A. The Narrowness of “Anger” in First Amendment Law: “Fighting
Words” for Whom?
First Amendment law has generally been leery of government
attempts to change the marketplace of emotions – except when it
has not been. Scientific evidence indicates that emotion and
rationality are not opposed, as the law often presumes, but rather
inextricably linked. There is no judgment, whether moral or
otherwise, without emotions to guide our choices. Judicial failure
to grapple with this reality has produced … puzzles in the law.
-Rebecca Tushnet71
The precision and accuracy of the “fighting words” doctrine may be
challenged on at least three grounds. First, it oversimplifies the emotion at
the individual level, drowning out variation in anger’s experience and
expression through its slippery “reasonable person” standard, failing to
account for how social forces affect certain individuals—notably women,
non-whites, and other members of historically marginalized
communities—and thus limit their expressions of emotion. Second, this
area of jurisprudence overly relies on an individual-rationalist perspective,
problematically excluding group dynamics while setting up discordant
approaches vis-à-vis other free speech doctrines, like those on incitement
and the speech-violence nexus more generally. Finally, and extending both
of these concerns, online speech combines the preceding two problems with
the conundrum of physical distance. Some speech may provoke and cross
the Chaplinsky-defined threshold for “fighting words,” inciting a similar
rage, but online “listeners,” lacking immediate, in-person recourse for
releasing their anger, then lash out in a manner more attenuated than the
Court in Chaplinsky (or Brandenburg, for the matter) contemplated. Of
these concerns, the limited conceptualization of anger—its gendered and
racialized elements—is crucial, the primary focus below.

71. Rebecca Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment, 127
HARV. L. REV. 2392 (2014). Cf. Lauren Berlant, The Epistemology of State Emotion, in
DISSENT IN DANGEROUS TIMES 47, 47 (Austin Sarat ed., 2005) (reifying the
rationality/emotion dichotomy and arguing that “political rationality as the core practice of
[American] democracy” is being supplanted by “a scene for the orchestration of public
feelings … of politics as a scene of emotional contestation,” including a particular post-9/11
public anger).
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B. Unpacking the Individual Characteristics of Listeners: The
Pernicious Presumptions Underlying Free Speech Exceptions
Like Seneca and Nussbaum, America’s founding-era constitutional
debates—including the eventual First Amendment—treated emotions as
both deeply political and yet rationally manageable, with a particular focus
on ameliorating impulses to act on anger.72 Over the intervening centuries,
abovementioned First Amendment cases reified this perspective through
the evolving “fighting words” and “incitement” doctrines. With Chaplinsky
as the signal case in the former area, however, the Supreme Court’s
approach to conceptualizing anger suffers several shortcomings.
Chaplinsky involved face-to-face, real-time actors and conceives of
anger as a snap response to a direct insult. This is an overly limited view;
anger can take on many temporal forms beyond the near-instantaneous,
reactive cases as in Chaplinsky, and it is affected by situational contexts
(venue and social setting, for instance) and individual experiences (gender,
race, class). Absent these considerations, the First Amendment’s “fighting
words” doctrine, among others, may mischaracterize anger perniciously.

72. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the first entry of what would become The
Federalist Papers, “[W]e are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are
influenced by purer principles than their antagonists … To judge from the conduct of the
opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the
justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of
their declamations and by the bitterness of their invectives.” Alexander Hamilton, The
Federalist No. 1, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, 7, 8 (Ian Shapiro, ed. 2009). Here, while
Hamilton raises the perpetual concern among the Framers regarding the “passions” of
individuals and groups, he also advances a view of American democracy as a deliberative,
rationalist one—i.e., one where (more or less careful) reasoning may at least temper
emotional reactions to political events and undergird a representative political system. For
a general discussion of deliberative democratic theory (and its limits), see Magdalena
Bexell, Jonas Tallberg, & Anders Uhlin, Democracy in Global Governance: The Promises
and Pitfalls of Transnational Actors, 16 GLOB. GOV. 81, 84 (2010) (defining the deliberative
democratic model as a system which “emphasizes deliberation among citizens [and] their
representatives” inasmuch as informed opinions are shared, tested, and revised collectively
and continuously); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
(1996); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (2004);
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996); Shawn W. Rosenberg, Rethinking Democratic
Deliberation: The Limits and Potential of Citizen Participation, 39 POLITY 335, 336 (2007);
IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 49 (2006). Cf. Lynn M. Sanders, Against
Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347, 348 (1997) (critiquing deliberative democracy and its
advocates on grounds that evidence for “substantive or empirical” support among “ordinary
citizens” for a more-deliberative system is lacking).
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1. Social Differences in Allowable Anger: Gender
As constitutional law scholars have observed, language throughout the
Chaplinsky opinion constrains anger to a gendered, i.e., male perspective.73
Chaplinsky, in that sense, is a “hypermasculine” exemption from presumed
“gentlemanly” expectations of conduct among men.74 Indeed, other
stereotypically “masculine” qualities abound in free speech doctrines and
marquee cases from the last century,75 effectively calibrating the Court’s
analysis in First Amendment cases toward a masculine view or ideal as a
default. That this is true for the Court’s general understanding of anger—
and concomitant evasion of the social contexts and norms constraining or
liberating individuals’ expressions of it—poses one of the central problems
of concern here.
As journalist Rebecca Traister explained in her recent book, Good and
Mad, American women face categorically separate norms of conduct and
expectations in expressing their anger, one where women’s repressed anger
builds over time after being targeted by pervasive sexual misconduct or
being “ignored, sidelined, and not taken seriously,” yet conventions
militate against acting in any manner that appears “belligerent” or
confrontational.76 From the introduction, Traister juxtaposes her approach
to anger with Nussbaum’s earlier Anger and Forgiveness.77 For Traister,
anger is not an “inherently vengeful impulse, and … therefore punitive and
counterproductive” as Nussbaum asserts; rather, anger can arise from
“objection to injustice” and “inequity” in society broadly or, in an
“optimistic” sense too often ignored, as “a communicative tool, a call to
action.”78 While pointing out how experiences and expressions of anger
among women may deviate from Nussbaum and American jurists’
understanding, Traister thus also poses a keen challenge to Seneca’s
elemental assumption: that anger itself is a necessarily “bad” or damaging
emotion in some way.

73. See John M. Kang, Manliness and the Constitution, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
261, 263 (2009) (“the fighting words doctrine targets men and draws from a gendered
worldview … and, although women theoretically can also retaliate with violence against
men or women, [the] Court never refers to the female perspective. For the Court, only men
threaten the public peace with their anger and, thus, only men must not be needlessly
aggravated”). See Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
74. See Kang, supra note 73, at 263.
75. Id. at 265 (citing Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)) (propounding a
“discourse about male identity” and the vital need for men to have “courage” in vindicating
their constitutional rights).
76. REBECCA TRAISTER, GOOD AND MAD: THE REVOLUTIONARY POWER OF WOMEN’S
ANGER xvi–xvii (2018).
77. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, ANGER AND FORGIVENESS: RESENTMENT, GENEROSITY,
JUSTICE (2016).
78. TRAISTER, supra note 76, at xxvi–xxvii.
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In short, Traister’s book makes the case that American women’s
outwardly expressed rage is experiencing a “contemporary reemergence …
as a mass impulse” during the Trump era.79 Throughout, women’s public
anger is shown as bipartisan,80 long-simmering,81 and increasingly
undisguised, occasionally acidly profane.82 While norms may be shifting
(among some) and more American women are claiming a broader range of
outward angry expression, especially among younger Americans.83 Traister
underlines throughout her writing that shifts are not complete
transformations. Even three-plus years after the 2016 election, “rage is an
emotion that is permitted and encouraged in (some) men,” but remains
“forbidden, invalidated, and treated as a path to self-defeat” for many
women by dominant figures in society.84 Good and Mad, after all,
catalogues the anger and actions of some of America’s most-powerful
women in media, entertainment, academia, and politics; they all face
double standards and regressive gendered tropes with regularity, suggesting
those in lower socioeconomic strata face even greater social and normative
impediments to expressing themselves.

79. Id. at 2.
80. For example, Traister cites Tea Party-linked women, both leaders and supporters,
angrily engaging in a traditionalist blowback against the Obama administration—part of a
lose bloc of traditionalist women dating at least to Phyllis Schlafly’s “antifeminist crusades
of the 1970s and 80s.” Id. at 6–7.
81. Id. at 9 (“[I]n the years leading up to the 2016 election, there was a building public
rage” among women and a greater willingness “to broadcast … powerful, desperately felt
anger” in public).
82. In one brief passage, Traister notes the cases of two women elected to high-profile
public offices: San Juan, Puerto Rico Mayor Carmen Yulín Cruz (“‘I don’t give a shit,’ Cruz
told reporters when asked about the president’s criticism”) and U.S. Senator Kirsten
Gillibrand (D-NY) (“Gillibrand, too, stopped being polite, telling [Traister] during a spring
2017 interview that officials are in Washington ‘to help people, and if we’re not helping
people we should go the fuck home’”). Id. at 36.
83. A captivating example highlighted by Traister is the “incandescently furious”
Emma González, one of the student leaders pushing for nationwide gun control reforms
following the 2018 mass shooting at Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland,
Florida, where 17 students were killed and more than a dozen more were injured. Id. at 42.
Accord Chelsea Bailey, At Rally, Parkland Shooting Survivors Rail Against Gun Laws, NRA
and Trump, NBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/rallyparkland-shooting-survivors-rail-against-gun-laws-nra-trump-n849076 [https://perma.cc/
72TE-G6BF].
84. TRAISTER, supra note 76, at 61. Post-election examples cited include media
censuring of late-night host Samantha Bee’s profanity-laden monologues and comedian
Michelle Wolf’s “brutal” standup set at the 2018 White House Correspondents’ Dinner, todate the last such Dinner to have a headliner. Id. at 104–05; the at-best partial reckonings
for high-profile men accused of horrific, sustained abuse of women, such as film producer
Harvey Weinstein, talk show host Charlie Rose, and producer and standup comic Louis C.K.
Id. at 136–46; and the sustained abuse of elected women who “had led the charge” in seeking
U.S. Senator Al Franken’s resignation following multiple reports of sexual misconduct. Id.
at 163–65.
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Generalizing these observations in legal contexts specifically, feminist
legal theorist Frances Olsen has explained them as a corpus of tendencies
toward gendered, hierarchical, and illusory “dualisms” in law.85 Several of
these erstwhile dualisms, “rational/irrational,” “thought/feeling,”
“reason/emotion,” underscore the preceding challenges to the First
Amendment’s conception of anger.86 Yet, Olsen argues law should reject
these false dichotomies altogether, not just recalibrate them, on both
empirical and normative grounds.87 As Olsen explains, the presence of such
gendered dualisms in law “accept in general the proposition that men and
women are different” without evidence and preclude considering their full
complexities.88 Rules designed with a narrow, stereotypically male
perspective in mind, like the machismo, snap-reactive one evinced in
Chaplinsky, are “too specific, definite, and contextualized to count as
principles,” because the social contexts of all other perspectives, including
those of all non-men, can never fit into their paradigm.89 Constitutional law
leaves room for “minor exceptions and subdoctrines that permit some
influence of the subjective, contextual, and personalized,” but the limits
placed on “subjective” or “personalized” considerations at the margins,
combined with the a priori general orientation toward principle, rationality,
and objectivity, only reaffirms biases favoring male-identified sides of the
dualisms Olsen addresses.90
2. Social Differences in Allowable Anger: Race and Racism
Race and racism, whether witting or not, present additional challenges
to the Chaplinsky model. For nonwhite Americans, racist stereotypes and
diverging governmental and cultural norms about expressing public anger
compound the complexities of expressing or repressing anger noted above.
Moreover, the state’s responses to different individuals and groups’ public
displays of anger—as in protest actions—vary on the basis of race. For
example, the recent cases of mass protests in Ferguson (2014) and the
Women’s Marches (2017 onward) displayed enormous disparities: police
responses to the majority-Black protesters in Ferguson were militarized and
violent compared to the anodyne permissiveness of authorities toward the
visibly white Women’s March organizers and attendees.91 In addition, race
85. Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
691, 691–92 (David Kairys, 3d ed. 1998).
86. Id. at 691.
87. See Olsen, supra note 85.
88. Id. at 695.
89. Olsen, supra note 85, at 701.
90. Id. at 703.
91. See Abby Harrington, Tanks and Rubber Bullets vs. Pussy Hats and High-Fives: A
Comparative Look at the 2014 Ferguson Uprising and the 2017 Women’s March on
Washington, 31 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 101 (2019). Accord Rod K. Brunson & Jody
Miller, Gender, Race, and Urban Policing: The Experience of African American Youths, 20
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and racism are not merely social phenomena, but instead are embedded in
past and present state institutions and often undergird actions taken by
state-linked actors. Those state-individual contexts include, among others,
racist patterns of policing and incarceration, as well as profoundly
asymmetric rates of arrest and prosecution.92 These considerations form a
daunting backdrop for nonwhite (and non-male) listeners, restraining their
responses in ways not contemplated by the Court in Chaplinsky and later
cases. Black and brown Americans have myriad deeply rooted claims for
condemning state authorities, for angrily castigating them in terms far
harsher than Chaplinsky’s censured utterance, but they also face far greater
chances of harm if they choose to do so. Censure limits free speech rights;
speaking out against racist systems often deprives speakers of color their
very lives.
Where race and sex intersect, like for Black women and other women
of color, the social context becomes more complex, with overlapping
dimensions of marginalization and norm-based censure. While the
contributions of critical race theory (CRT) to legal scholarship writ large
have been exemplary, constitutional law theorists and the federal courts
alike still exhibit, as Kimberlé Crenshaw has put it, a “tendency to treat race
and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis.”93
Crenshaw has explained that this tendency is “perpetuated by [the]
single-axis framework” which dominates theory and practice, a framework
perhaps best illustrated by antidiscrimination law cases where Black
women must elect either race or sex/gender as grounds for their claims, but
not both.94 Such “compound claims,” according to federal courts’ reasoning
across several cases, are not within the bounds of discrimination
contemplated by Congress when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964; in
effect, such cases have held, the “discrimination against Black women”
cannot conceivably “exist independently from the experiences of white
women or of Black men.”95 Even where white men expressly are not the
implied or explicit presumed perspective under law, as with legislation and
litigation concerning sex discrimination, there remains an “implicit
grounding of white female experiences” that prevents Black (and other
GENDER & SOC’Y 531, 533–34 (2006); TRAISTER, supra note 76 at 8, 29–31. For a discussion
of the background for local police departments’ militarization from the 1990s to the present,
seeKATHLEEN BELEW, BRING THE WAR HOME: THE WHITE POWER MOVEMENT AND
PARAMILITARY AMERICA 188–91 (2018).
92. See, e.g., ANGELA DAVIS, POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND
IMPRISONMENT 11–13, 17–21 (2017).
93. Kimberlé Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and
Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 356, 356 (David Kairys, 3d ed.
1998).
94. Id.
95. Crenshaw, supra note 93, at 357. See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. as amended (2009).
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nonwhite) women from making specific legal claims—that their
discrimination is because they are Black women (or they are Latina, or
Indigenous women, and so on).96 In such a way, the relegation of nonwhite
perspectives beyond the default framework of free speech jurisprudence
compounds the relegation of women’s perspectives; Black and brown
women, specifically, are doubly overlooked and unconsidered in these
cases.
The confluence of a (white, male) exclusionary lexicon of emotions in
First Amendment doctrine with the preceding realities of race-based or
multidimensional marginalization should give theorists and practitioners
pause. These issues are likely further compounded by other overlapping
characteristics—from class and socioeconomic status to sexuality, religious
affiliations, disability status, and more—which configure individuals’ lived
realities, including emotional expression or repression.97 The cognitivist
view undergirding First Amendment jurisprudence simply does not account
for this multiplicity in speech settings and normative restrictions on actual
individual expressions. The costs and perils facing angry listeners are not
equally distributed—nor are individuals’ attendant chances of being
afforded grace after acting from a place of anger. These blindspots must be
identified fully and brought into theoretical and practical discussions of
First Amendment jurisprudence.
C. Law’s Muddled Understandings of Anger’s Duration and Relation
with Ressentiment and Resentment
While the Court’s understandings of anger, rage, and resentment at
least are serviceably close to the traditional philosophical conceptions of
Seneca and Martha Nussbaum, however limited, the legal field’s
comprehension of ressentiment is far less clear.
Per Traister, longevity and suppression are recurring themes in the
recent history of women’s rage—the prolonged duration of cumulative
adverse experiences driving women’s post-election rage, for instance, defy

96. Crenshaw, supra note 93, at 359. For nonwhite women, therefore, the intersections
of race and sex mean discrimination can arise in one of three ways: “from sex discrimination
or race discrimination or both.” Id. at 361 (emphasis added). Sexuality, class, and other
bases for discriminatory treatment may add further dimensions atop these, which are
discussed briefly in Part III(B)(3), infra, although no comprehensive account of all potential
dimensions is feasible in this limited space. For a broad overview of “intersectionality” in
law and politics, see also Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991);
Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself: Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 647 (1996).
For a broad critique of single-axis frameworks and their erasure of Black women’s
particularly situated experiences, see BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM (1995).
97. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 93. See also Lucy A. Williams, Welfare and
Legal Entitlements: The Social Roots of Poverty, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 569 (David Kairys, 3d ed. 1998).

232

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31:2

the characterizations of Nussbaum or Supreme Court justices.98 Still other
scenarios clearly implicate the concepts of resentment and ressentiment in
ways that blur the distinction between “advocacy” and action specifically
found in Brandenburg. Contemporary followers of various American farright movements, for example, recently were described as a precise class of
“bigot,” one who harbors a “fierce resentment of modernity’s advocates
and beneficiaries,” combining both the envious idea of ressentiment in
Nietzsche and Scheler,99 but also on the vigorous resistance against “the
forces of modernity,” which the bigot fears.100 A toxic mixture of fear,
simmering resentments, and hatreds, when combined with a proximate
trigger for anger amid less-constraining norms against expressing it, can
prove combustible; repetitious “mere advocacy,” especially in the fervid,
insular online ecosystem of far-right communities, may readily prompt
targeted actions by reactionary acolytes.101
Laws, like the Constitution itself, must achieve broad generality in their
applications to individuals across varied experiences, positions, and time.
But in making the “fighting words” doctrine, with an implicitly narrow,
exclusionary conception of anger, the Supreme Court simply did not

98. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying discussion. See also Part IV(B)(2), supra
for discussion of the interactions between race and gender, as they similarly implicate
resentment and ressentiment.
99. See supra Part II, passim.
100. Stephen Eric Bronner, From Modernity to Bigotry, in CRITICAL THEORY AND
AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM 85, 89 (Jeremiah Morelock, ed. 2018).
101. Id. at 91–92. Even where ressentiment has been encompassed in academic works,
many legal scholars addressing the concept do so through attenuated analysis—for instance,
those who study the legal field’s representation in literature, film, and other popular media,
see also, Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive: Retributivism and
the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2183 n. 133
(2001) (“[W]hen I use ‘moralist’ or ‘moralizing’ I am referring to the scolding sensibility of
the schoolteacher, the kind of person who punishes, and enjoys punishing, as a result of
what Nietzsche called ‘ressentiment’); William H. Page, The Place of Law and Literature,
39 VAND. L. REV. 391, 404 (1996) (defining ressentiment as a “prolonged sense of injury
based on real or imagined insult”). Or in legal philosophy, as well as some others working
from within various critical legal studies traditions, see also Lolita Buckner Inniss, A
Domestic Right of Return: Race, Rights, and Residency in New Orleans in the Aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 325, 356 (2007) (“The ideological sibling of
the culture of crime is the culture of victimhood, based on a ‘rhetoric of grievance’ and
‘ressentiment’ that become part of a group’s ‘constitutive traits’”—both of which Inniss
rejects.). To say scholars have not offered consistent characterizations of the term or fully
understood its evolution over the last century would be an understatement. See generally
Peter Goodrich, Sleeping with the Enemy: An Essay on the Politics of Critical Legal Studies
in America, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 389, 424 (1993) (while critiquing critical legal studies on
various grounds, Goodrich seems to endorse a comparison to the American Left’s general
failure to command political power: A “‘pervasive melancholy’ … frequently interpreted as
leading from politics to aesthetics—to the ‘hyperinflation of aesthetic discourses’—and
from activism to passivity if not ressentiment.” What that means, one can only begin to
guess, perhaps.).
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contemplate the nuances of anger, resentments, and social constraints faced
by a full majority of all Americans.
D. Strategies for Decentering Gendered, Racialized First Amendment
Jurisprudence
1. Critical Legal Theories, Emotions, and Anger
The foregoing analysis of free speech doctrines’ covertly gendered and
racialized assumptions echoes several core premises of CLS. Borrowing
Cornel West’s articulation, the conclusions are geared toward the
imperatives of offering “theoretical critiques of [academic] liberal
paradigms” and providing bases for action by and within “radical
organizations that engage in extra parliamentary action,” all the while
offering pragmatic lessons to legal practitioners.102 For legal theorists
broadly, exposing the gendered, racialized conceptions of emotions and
anger in First Amendment jurisprudence—and how these concepts
ultimately exclude all but a small minority who effectively receive even
greater legal protections—invites others to envision novel, creative means
of erasing such obscure inequities. The key doctrines covered under
Chaplinsky and Brandenburg, for instance, might be seen as worthy of
sustained efforts to eliminate or significantly narrow them; conversely, one
or another might be worth extending, broadening the reach to capture a
fuller range of experiences surveyed above. While the takeaways discussed
below suggest ranges of options, not certain conclusions, they seek West’s
notion of giving “visibility and legitimacy” to otherwise overlooked issues
in law and toward exposing “the intellectual blinders” of scholarship and
practice which reify real-world inequities, damaging stereotypes, and
resistant hierarchies.103
2. Legal Activists and Practitioners:
Brandenburg – or Leave Them for Dead?

Revive

Chaplinsky,

For activists and practitioners, the “fighting words” doctrine of
Chaplinsky presents two strategic possibilities looking ahead: reviving it,
but with a more-expansive understanding of the emotions and experiences
which may produce angered reactions to provoking speakers, or killing
what remains of the dormant doctrine, suffused as it is with presumptions
that exclude. Each strategy entails tradeoffs. Reviving Chaplinsky to
include a greater range of individuals and groups’ experiences would allow
future plaintiffs the benefit of a First Amendment jurisprudence which
actually understands how anger functions. It is not always fleeting; it can
result from repressed, simmering frustrations and emanate from a collective
102. Cornel West, The Role of Law in Progressive Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 708, 711 (David Kairys, 3d ed. 1998).
103. Id. at 714–15.
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boiling-over; and it is constrained by social norms rooted in gender, race,
and other characteristics, all of which place unequal expectations on
different individuals’ emotional expressions. Given the Supreme Court’s
inconsistent framing of racist speech and conduct seen in R.A.V. v. St. Paul
and Virginia v. Black, using litigation as a strategy to widen the forms of
speech understood as fighting words—and thus unprotected, with a greater
range of listeners’ reactions viewed as reasonable—presents uncertainty.
Conversely, attempts to finish off Chaplinsky, to finally overrule it on
grounds of vagueness or its lack of workable evaluative standards, may
remove a gendered, racialized doctrine from constitutional law. At the same
time, doing so risks foreclosing litigation tactics in future cases where
federal courts have (hypothetically) opened themselves to a more-nuanced
understandings of positionality and identity.
Brandenburg’s “incitement” (or “imminent lawless action”) concept
presents an even more complex set of considerations. The “imminence”
factor—requiring incitement to produce or be likely to produce unlawful
action, essentially, right after the speaker has uttered it—may militate
against minority groups and individuals’ interests in cases where extremist
rhetoric calls for action vaguely or eventually, not imminently. This is not
a hypothetical; rather, it reflects the rhetoric of far-right leaders which
already has seeped into judicial analyses of their followers’ violent actions,
as in two 2019 cases involving Gavin McInnes, a key figure in the Proud
Boys gang, whose followers were sentenced to four years each in prison
after perpetrating a gang assault.104 Those cases relate to a broader class of
far-right speakers, activists, and perpetrators of violence, in the U.S. and
globally, whose conduct undermines the Supreme Court’s attempt to
distinguish fully protected, pure political expression from unprotected
forms of incitement or true threats.
To put a finer point on it, the doctrinal morass left by Chaplinsky,
Brandenburg, and their combined progeny leads to questions of linedrawing: When does fiery rhetoric become an invitation to commit
violence? When ought such an invitiation trigger liability? Absent the
“imminence” required under Brandenburg or the somewhat lesser
requirements of threats under Watts, what workable alternative standard
could courts use to proscribe later-in-time threats of unlawful conduct?
How are we to distinguish violent ideologies—presumptively protected, as
in the Klan’s white-ethnonationalist ambitions, however intrinsically
genocidal—from intent, imminence, threats? These are profoundly
challenging questions, and it will be a daunting task for legal scholars and
practitioners. Using far-right and reactionary political actors as an example,
the constellation of vocal leaders of reactionary “online subcultures,”
including the range of “internet trolls, anti-feminist gamers, conspiracy
104.

See Campbell supra note 66 and accompany discussion.
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theorists, and ideologues, such as men’s rights activists and members of the
so-called ‘alt-right,’” exposes known entities to light; these same
subcultures, after all, have “relied on the power of celebrity,” not
anonymity, so line-drawing questions are not patently unfeasible.105 Even
aside from cases of radicalization through online media consumption are
known and traceable,106 cases like the Proud Boys and Gavin McInnes107
might be easier to distinguish: their speech expressly invokes violence,
even if not imminently, as the overriding goal. The temporal distinction
drawn by the Court in Brandenburg, much like its predication on a hairtrigger understanding of anger’s temporality, cannot account for these reallife and sometimes deadly cases.
CLS and other progressive-left legal scholars typically have embraced
extant, expansive First Amendment protections for reasons of principle and
pragmatism alike. Giving the federal courts greater power to regulate the
content of individuals’ beliefs or speech would expose already
marginalized groups to the latent and overt biases of judges and Supreme
Court justices just as surely as it could curb rhetoric propagating violent
ideologies. Indeed, for that very reason, these concluding remarks do not
call into question the “free speech principle” in general.108 After all,
targeting the “mere advocacy” of the Klan’s ideology through a refinement
of the 1960s-era Ohio criminal syndicalism statute could, in the hands of
hostile authorities or equivocal courts, open up leftist radicals to censure to
the extent their “advocacy” contemplates extralegal strategies of protest
and action. With these manifold challenges and pragmatic uncertainties in
clearer view, plus the concerns of potential backlash in mind, the need for
considerable further examination of how anger’s framing in free speech
claims is abundantly clear.

105. Rebecca Lewis, “This Is What the News Won’t Show You”: YouTube Creators and
the Reactionary Politics of Micro-Celebrity, TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA 1, 7 (2019).
106. Id. at 7–8 (discussing the process of getting “red pilled,” i.e., right-wing and farright followers’ “rejection of mainstream media,” and thus greater acceptance of “alternative
narratives,” presages radicalization). Accord Rebecca Lewis, Alternative Influence:
Broadcasting the Reactionary Right on YouTube, DATA & SOC’Y RES. INST., https://data
society.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/DS_Alternative_Influence.pdf [https://perma.cc
/6BV7-MRL6] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
107. Campbell, supra note 66.
108. This reflects a warning provided by Steven Shiffrin over 25 years ago, in which he
argued against views holding the “free speech principle” as intrinsically “harmful to the
left,” since that “thesis does not take sufficient account of the multiplicity of power relations
both in and out of the mass media” and is “too blasé about the kinds of interventions one
might expect from the government.” Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and
the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689, 692 (1994). Even taking for granted that
“conservative forces can control the market,” then they also “can control the government
and repress dissident movements,” no less those who hope to undermine gendered and
racialized First Amendment doctrines, like those surveyed above. Id.
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